posted 02-03-2010 11:58 PM            

If research shows that using CQs without time bars results in higher accuracy, then using time bars DOES hurt.

posted 02-04-2010 12:56 PM            

As such, it's not an unreasonable assumption that I would have been even more accurate in my research if I had used CQs that were not time barred.

I think the point of Frank's results is that any examiner, whatever his skill level, will make the right call more of the time if he uses CQs without time bars.

posted 02-04-2010 05:28 PM            

Lou

posted 02-08-2010 01:18 PM            

When exclusive comparisons were used, the detection rate was 94%. When inclusive comparisons were used, the detection rate dropped to 83%.

posted 02-09-2010 09:26 AM            

In this article, four research studies are looked at, Podlesny & Raskin (1978), Horvath (1988), Palmatier (1991), and Amsel (1999).

The Podlesny & Raskin study showed more descriminative responses in some of the pysiological measurments when using exclusionary but no effect on decision accuracy between the two.

Horvath's study showed no significant difference between detection accuracies of the two, but nonexclusives produced fewer errors with both innocent and guilty.

Palmatier's study indicated nonexclusives had higher accuracy and produced fewer false positives.

Amsel's field study produced resulst suggesting that nonexclusives render stronger average scores toward the correct conclusion for both innocent and guilty.

The conclusion of the evidence is that exclusionary are not superior to nor more effective than nonexclusionary.

posted 02-09-2010 11:53 AM            

Why? Firstly, it is darn-near impossible to control for every variable in the field (and sometimes int he lab), so results are influenced at times by uncontrolled variance. Secondly, it is also not unheard of that researchers engage a personal bias (especially when they are selling something with their name or personal fortune attached to it) - so we require complete description and replication. Finally, because everything in science, physics and the universe is ultimately a matter of probabilities - results are sometimes observed to come out in unexpected ways. What we want to know is how is tends to come out most of the time.

We humans like absolute statements - so we invent things, sell absolutes, and sometimes line up like imprinted gooslings behind our favorite pied piper who wants to lead us his way. What is really important is to think for ourselves - so that we are not vulnerable to a smooth-talkin' well-dressed salesman offering us a new and improved brand of reptile lube. The more desperately we want it (whether "it" is a simple answer or a product), the more likely we are to find a shark-skinned vendor.

Remember that in science, nothing is ever "proved" or "concluded" - especially when we are trying to prove a negative. Consider this "it is always that way" translates to the scientific statement "it is never not that way." Which defines our challenge - proving it is never not that way (negative).

In science, we have evidence in support of an idea - in support of the validity of some fancy idea or hypothesis, because even the concept of validated is not absolute. And we have evidence that contradicts the validity of an idea. What we are still faced with is the need to consider which evidence is more abundant or more convincing, and which evidence is more likely to be the expression of a researcher bias, uncontrolled variance, or just a simple spurious result.

And for those who want one simple and concrete answer right now, there will always be volunteers to fill the role of their fearless leader.

.02

r

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"Gentlemen, you can't fight in here. This is the war room."
--(Stanley Kubrick/Peter Sellers - Dr. Strangelove, 1964)

posted 02-10-2010 10:14 AM            

Trying to explain differential salience or cognitive dissonance is a bit tougher.

Warning: unsubstantiated opinion not backed by research follows

If differential salience is what causes the reactions, then there should be more salience to direct questions about the specific crime or incident than to the general comparison questions for the deceptive person and therefore more salience to the NDI person to the comparison questions.

posted 02-10-2010 11:23 AM            

quote:

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If differential salience is what causes the reactions....]

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posted 02-10-2010 11:43 AM            

Poor choice of words on my part. I agree.

What I was trying to say is that if one of the two types of questions (comparison or relevant) is more salient or creates more salience then answering that question falsely as "no" when the assumed proper response should be honestly "yes" creates cognitive dissonance and therefore a physiological reaction.

I guess we are analizing differential salience or differential cognitive dissonance when we compare the two types of questions??????

posted 02-10-2010 12:46 PM            

You raise a very good point, that I have been attempting to dialog when possible: that salience, or differential salience if you like that term (even though it is a little redundant - because the concept of salience implies difference - but I've been told I can sometimes be redundant or repeat myself over and over also), may not be a completely satisfactory explanation.

I find it easy to explain salience, because it says basically the same thing as psychological set - but doesn't limit the dialog to emotion (or the singular emotion of fear, for the singular reason of consequences for lying). Salience allows us to understand that other things like memory, cognition, and behavioral experience (conditioning) may also play a role, along with emotion. We don't need to parse out the proportions of emotion, cognition and behavioral conditioning, and these may vary for individuals and groups.

The problem is that salience seems incomplete when considering that DLCs are expected to and observed to generally cause larger reactions for truthful examinees, compared with their reactions to the sometimes intense issues for which those truthful examinees are falsely accused.

The challenge for us polygraph professionals is to keep dialogging, and keep exploring the possibilities, until we have a satisfactory explanation.

The hazard will be the need to have a simple answer right now, along with the tendency to limit our intelligence to our hyperbole (the simple things we say).

I heard a really nice and efficient packaged explanation of cognitive dissonance - from a non-psycho-babbling field examiner. Cognitive dissonance is the difference between our actual behavior and what we say in language or words. Nice huh? It is packaged and efficient, and does begin to illustrate why a truthful person reacts less to an RQ regarding a false allegation (no difference between their behavior and words) and more to a DLC, for which there is a distinct difference between behavior and what one says which can produce physiological reactions related to emotion, cognition (memory or other cognitive activity), and behavioral conditioning.

What we may need is a more expedient and fluid dialog about the role of cognitive dissonance in the examinees assignment of differential salience to RQs and DLCs (or PLCs).

.02

r

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"Gentlemen, you can't fight in here. This is the war room."
--(Stanley Kubrick/Peter Sellers - Dr. Strangelove, 1964)

posted 02-10-2010 11:10 PM            

The notion of cognitive dissonance requires no concrete definition. It is not a reflex. It is a generic term, not specific to any particular emotion or pattern of cognitive activity. It is a general sense of discomfort produced by the difference between thoughts/statement (verbal) and action. It's how we get people to stop smoking - in cognitive terms (which means we forgo the concept of smoking addiction for the purpose of discussion). People tell themselves something positive about smoking (relaxation, whatever,...) so they do it. They know smoking is bad for them, and justify it through cognitive rationalizations such as "but it relaxes me..." or "but I need it for now..." or "just one more..." To the degree that we can get people to state "it's bad for me and will kill me..." and stop before articulating (vocally or sub-vocally) any rationalization, and ideally replace the rationalization/justification with an additional factual statement about the fact that it is expensive, smells bad and doesn't help, then it will not be as satisfying, will be more likely to become dissatisfying, and people eventually reduce and stop their smoking.

To really understand these things you have to unlock ourselves from the language of emotion, and engage the construct at a general and inarticulate level of "discomfort" (non-specific to any particular emotion) in the form of some kind of internal dissonance resulting from the difference between what one says and what one does. When the dissonance is relieved by rationalization, the smoking behavior will more likely persist.

The mistake we make is to continue to engage in discussions of emotion when attempting to discuss cognition and behavioral conditioning. It is useful practice to take the stance of radical behaviorism - and try to explain the behavioral conditioning and cognitive models as if emotion has nothing to do with it. Then we'll begin to understand the role of cognition and conditioning, and we can later re-connect that understanding with our usual dialog of emotion.

There are two forms of conditioning that seem to get discussed. One of them (the common one) is contaminated with emotion laden dialog, the other is not.

One model of conditioning regarding lies or false statements relies on socialization, and makes use of some fancy/schmancy psychodynamic regressive event in which we are "subconsciously brought back to our childhood." The problem with this conditioning model is that it is really a psychodynamic (emotion) model in disguise as a conditioning model. It also assumed that our criminal examinees were socialized to understand that lying is bad. In fact, they may have had role models demonstrating lying and deceit as viable forms of problem solving or goal seeking. Lying might seem like a good thing to them. So, we have the same question about why the polygraph works with psychopaths, and it is not satisfactory to explain this in terms of our own socialization or our personal values about lying.

A non-psychodynamic, behavioral model of conditioning (as if emotion has nothing to do with it) suggests that involvement in an event or activity creates behavioral learning and a conditioned (physiological though non-emotional) response potential that can be subsequently activated by stimulus cues related to the conditioning event. This model does a much more satisfactory job explaining why the polygraph works with psychopaths (who lack genuine emotions, sometimes learn to fake emotions, and have low levels of fear conditioning).

The most parsimonious explanation (the one that accounts for the broadest range of observed phenomena with the simplest possible explanation) is probably cognitive dissonance.

It will important for us to not get into circular discussions that attempt turn cognitive dissonance into discrete emotions, or reflexes. It is enough to understand that cognitive dissonance is general and non-specific, and may be the result of varying degrees of emotion, cognition/memory, and behavioral conditioning. We don't have to know what those proportions are, and they may vary for individuals. We also don't have to explain anything more - and we run the risk of making erroneous and silly assumptions if we work too hard to explain a non-descript phenomena like cognitive dissonance. It is probably enough to state that it is the difference (experienced internally and manifested physiologically) between what someone says and what they do.

.02

r

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"Gentlemen, you can't fight in here. This is the war room."
--(Stanley Kubrick/Peter Sellers - Dr. Strangelove, 1964)

posted 02-11-2010 07:02 AM            

quote:

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It is useful practice to take the stance of radical behaviorism - and try to explain the behavioral conditioning and cognitive models as if emotion has nothing to do with it.

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posted 02-11-2010 08:24 AM            

I'm not saying you should actually endorse radical behaviorism.

What I'm saying is that it is useful to use their strict dialog (temporarily) - to understand how to talk about behavioral models without inadvertently corrupting our behavioral language with psychodynamic concepts (those that revolve around emotion).

Nobody things that radical behaviorism is satisfactory - not because it is strictly wrong, but because it is obviously incomplete. It is negligent of emotion and cognition (ie., learning at higher levels of consciousness such as language and self-awareness and such).

Similarly, nobody things that psychodynamic psychology is accurate - not because emotions don't matter, but because discussions that focus solely on emotion are incomplete.

Going further, even cognitive psychology is incomplete - though there was never really an attempt among cognitive psychologists to adopt a radical stance. Instead, cognitive psychology seems to have emerged late in the history of psychology, and there was a developed recognition of the inseparability of cognition, emotion, and behavior. So, you'll tend to hear terms like Cognitive-behavioral (Michenbaum), and rational-emotive (Ellis), and Dialectical-behavioral (Linehan) - all of which discuss cognition, emotion, and behavior.

Don't get stuck on radical behaviorism - but TRY to describe a behavioral or cognitive model without inadvertently slipping back into an unsatisfactory discussion that places most of our attention on the psychodynamic processes of emotion and neglects the cognitive and behavioral aspect we are trying to describe.

r

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"Gentlemen, you can't fight in here. This is the war room."
--(Stanley Kubrick/Peter Sellers - Dr. Strangelove, 1964)

posted 02-11-2010 09:13 AM            

quote:

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Nobody things that radical behaviorism is satisfactory - not because it is strictly wrong, but because it is obviously incomplete. It is negligent of emotion and cognition (ie., learning at higher levels of consciousness such as language and self-awareness and such).

---

My point is that this statement is an oversimplification (and wrong). The "radical" in radical behaviorism is there because they consider emotion, private thoughts and matters from within the organism. That is, it's inclusive, and they trace respondent behavior back to emotion.

Don't get me wrong - I think the behaviorists have some of the answers we have been looking for. Moreover, they aren't so interested in creating fictional psychological constructs to explain (often via question begging) behavior we all can observe. The mentalists reject us because we can't explain the underlying construct, while the behaviorists - who have no idea what we do - look at the behavior (and how to change it).

Now I'm going to oversimplify, but think of sex offenders, for example. The mentalist will try to answer the "why" question, while the behaviorist will look at the behavior and ask questions such as "What schedule of reinforcement is it on?" and "What occurs just before and after it?" and on, and on.... With that information and the science of human behavior, he asks "What intervention is necessary to change the behavior?

All of their literature is criterion based (another oversimplification). Sure, they have a model for how mental illness comes to be. (It's based on respondent behavior.) However, they are interested finding out what happens to a given behavior when a stimulus is introduced or removed (yet another oversimplification, I know). That's what we do. We introduce a stimulus and we look for a response. In other words, we may have neglected some allies.

Radical behaviorists (and not all who claim to be really are) aren't anti-cognitivists. They just think most cognitive theories aren't all that scientific or consistent with what is observed in nature. Howard Rachlin wrote a book describing the similarities and differences in a book on choice (which overlaps with economic theory). At that level of discussion, the conversation is more of a philosophy debate than a science debate, which leads me to my next point.

posted 02-11-2010 03:10 PM            

I mostly agree with your synopsis of behaviorism. Also, I don't subscribe to radical behaviorist ideas, but as an exercise in perspective-taking and dialog it is useful to attempt to see their view. It is also useful to understand that attempts to describe behavioral conditioning in the form of subconscious regression to a childhood state or event is really not a discussion of behavioral model but is our own regressing to a psychodynamic (emotional regression) model. My statement about radical behaviorism only looks wrong because I think you might be trying to evaluate the statement as if radical behaviorism presents an acceptable framework or model. It does not - and yes, they always end up discussing emotion and learning. This is because they are probably inseparable.

Behaviorism (even the non-radical flavor) becomes clearly inadequate when you consider that any theory of psychology had really ought to be able to account for and explain not just goal seeking behavior but also the problem of self-destructive behaviors. Behaviorism cannot satisfactorily do that - we all know this. On the other hand, psychodynamic models may do a more satisfactory job of this, and we all know how inadequate psychodynamic models are at measuring observed behavior and facilitating actual change (they seem not to work will at all).

The cognitive-behavioral model (thoughts-feelings-behavior) seems to be the most inclusive and parsimonious, and the basic premise of cognitive dissonance might be the most efficient explanation for the range polygraph reaction phenomena: CQT (PLC and DLC variants) and effectiveness with psychopaths, but seems incomplete when considering CIT/recognition tests, silent answer tests and yes answer tests.

As for naturalism implying determinism. I do not agree. Naturalism is the origin of science - and suggests that all naturally ocurring phenomena (which are basically all phenomena) are subject to observation, and can therefor be subject to measurement and things like hypothesis testing. Naturalism emerged as an alternative to supernatural explanations that attempted to account for observed phenomena through mysticism. Determinism, by definition, carries a mystical implication - else who does or who did all that there determining. To oversimplify further, naturalism asks "what" and seeks answers through observation, while determinism asks "why" and attempts to answer the question with "because the gods are pleased or angry," or "because it is the will of God." This of course begs the question: who interprets (and imposes) that there will of God?

Not sure that the heck this has to do with CQT time bars, but it does seem to have a lot to do with understanding CQT reactions and the idea of psychological set.

This is a lot more fun than doing real work - and will probably need whiskey and cigars at some point.

.02

r

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"Gentlemen, you can't fight in here. This is the war room."
--(Stanley Kubrick/Peter Sellers - Dr. Strangelove, 1964)

posted 02-18-2010 09:06 PM            

My bad on this one. I meant physicalism: the notion that the physical is all there is, and thus we're little more than chemical reactions.

I've never heard determinism explained as you did, but you did say you oversimplified.

Here's a quick Google definition that better expresses what I was thinking (and yes, it was the first page I found other than that horrible Wikipedia):

quote:

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Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/#DetHumAct

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Did you mean "begs the question" or "raises the question"? If the former, I'm missing the circular reasoning.

posted 02-19-2010 12:25 AM            

Of course, physicalism is always a bit unsatisfactory. But then dualism doesn't satisfy either because it still attempts to compartmentalize the physical and spiritual - and forces them to work independently - which is the problem of unsatisfaction that I started with...

I don't find that definition for determinism satisfactory at all (but who am I). It attempts to anchor itself in enlightenment-age physicalism - with the term "natural law" - which still raises the question about who made and imposes those natural laws??? It is therefore, still anchored in a mystical or supernatural origin - which is fine, but seems to miss the point in an intentional sort of way. Of course, the real problems with determinism, naturalism, and physicalism is that they simply neglect to account for things like choice, and randomness/probability (and spiritual things). But these are, after all, philosophical perspectives, not theories of physics.

Anyway, it's late and my head hurts now too.

Always fun arguing with you - out of respect and friendship. I learn something every time.

Peace,

r

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"Gentlemen, you can't fight in here. This is the war room."
--(Stanley Kubrick/Peter Sellers - Dr. Strangelove, 1964)

posted 02-19-2010 05:09 PM            

quote:

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and forces them to work independently

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posted 02-19-2010 06:05 PM            

I'd vote for either of you to replace Barney Frank or Nancy Pelosi or the Muslin guy with the funny name and fake birth certificate....

Just kidding, I'm really not stockpiling ammunition in my basement. Hell, I don't even have a basement under my double-wide mobile home!

posted 02-22-2010 10:14 AM            

We solved world hunger last year, but nobody listened so we gave up on politics.

These are the questions we usually leave to college philosophy classes or religious education; however, they may impact on what we do as well (to some extent, perhaps).

For example, if the soul (which physicalists say doesn't exist) is the seat of the mind, will and emotions, then trying to find a completely physical explanation of why we respond as we do will likely fall short. Think about this one for a minute: if you believe in the "traditional" God, then you hold that He is spirit - not flesh (at least until the Incarnation). If God is not flesh, then he doesn't have a brain like we do. Thus, He doesn't need a brain to think. Many hold that we don't need the brain either - in a way, anyhow. We weren't created to have our immaterial and material "parts" divided though, so if the brain doesn't work, we don't have immediate access to what is stored therein.

Think of it like this: you're strapped into a car and you can't get out. The car stalls and won't start. You can't move. That's similar to what some say happens in us: when the brain "stalls," then we can't do what we could if it were working.

We're now at the point in polygraph where we know "the brain is where it's happening," so to speak. Some hold that if you push button A, then B must happen, and on and on.... (That's oversimplified, but stay with me.) My concern is that there is an immaterial part of man and some things happen there - and we can't observe or measure those things - and they can impact whether A is going to cause B to happen this time. There are some who think we'll one day be able to "read minds" as if they will be able to "see" my thoughts with some type of tool. I don't think we'll ever get there because I don't think you'll ever find my thought of a pink elephant anywhere in my head. (Sure you may see certain parts activated, but you won't find the image of the elephant. It's not physically there. If you could, then you could say my thought was closer to one ear than the other.)

I think God "wired us" so that we are very orderly, and therefore we can adopt an almost deterministic approach. When B doesn't happen in the physicalist's world, he has no real explanation for it in his model (other than he missed a variable - which unfortunately may be true). The material / immaterial model (and there's more than one - sorry) leaves room for those unobservable variables.

By the way, there is a completely non-religious logical argument for an immaterial nature of man. It's not like you have to have a Christian worldview to come to that conclusion. But, that's the beauty of logic, we are all free to reject any conclusions we desire - even if doing so is illogical.

That's what makes these conversations fun. We're dealing with people, and we're trying to figure out how to know what's going on inside their heads. Our model of man helps guide those conversations, and it's always good to have those models challenged so we can better them or abandon them as necessary. We believe a lot of things in our lifetime, but we don't always stop to see if all our beliefs are consistent and work together.

With all that said, I don't think it's impossible to figure out what we're doing. I think we're about there, and as Ray said, a cognitive / behavioral model best fits (as long as we agree the physiology is behavior).

posted 02-22-2010 02:14 PM            

As humans, we appear to have an innate desire to respond to questions posed to us. Questions incite the mind to respond with information it possesses. I also believe that the desire to respond to the request for information from another human being is strong and difficult to overcome. So strong, in fact that we have a desire to answer a question to which he know the answer, even when the question is asked of another.

I also believe that we are accustomed to “reading” both the non-verbal and verbal reaction to our response to questions posed by others to gauge their acceptance of our response. Therefore, when we ask a question of someone during a polygraph examination who, by virtue of their circumstance, cannot truthfully answer the question and we limit their response to “yes” or “no” (no explanation) and prohibit them from receiving and evaluating our verbal and non-verbal reaction which they have learned to depend upon, we frustrate that innate desire to answer. That frustration exhibits itself physically with changes which we can record and evaluate. I personally don’t believe upbringing, religious background or beliefs about right and wrong have much to do with it. That frustrated desire may be a considered as “conditioned” or “learned”, but I believe that it exists and that it is strong. I think it is what makes us talk to the television when we hear a question posed to which we know the answer. I think it is what makes us offer information we possess to someone even when the question is being posed to another.

I have little faith in “fear of detection” and “psychological set” as they have been explained to me as the rationale for what we see on polygraph charts.
We can call it ego or we can call it anything we want but we need to ask ourselves what makes someone feel compelled to answer a question on the Internet in a forum of strangers? What makes us offer information to a stranger asking directions of someone else on the street? What makes us raise our hands when a lecturer asks a question to which we have what we consider to be the correct answer?

In summary, being in a position that requires us to answer a question with information we know is incorrect such as answering a polygraph question with “no” when we know the correct answer is “yes” and doing so in a visual and aural vacuum such as that of a polygraph examination where we cannot judge the reaction of the questioner creates a physical change in our body that can be captured and evaluated.

posted 02-23-2010 01:17 PM            

We're too busy blowing smoke and sunshine at each other to solve any real problems...

r

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"Gentlemen, you can't fight in here. This is the war room."
--(Stanley Kubrick/Peter Sellers - Dr. Strangelove, 1964)